Part 1 - Formation: Building the Portfolio Before Securitization
By Phoenix American
How capital structures, vehicles and early operational choices shape the future of an aviation ABS transaction
A n Aviation asset-backed securitisation (ABS) rarely starts at the securitisation stage. It starts in the months and even years earlier, in the choices that sponsors and lessors make about how they form capital and build portfolios. For future aviation ABS issuers, understanding these early “paths” is the foundation for judging how durable an eventual ABS take out transaction is likely to be.
From capital idea to aviation ABS
In most cases, aviation ABS is an exit, not an entry. A sponsor, lessor or fund first chooses how to raise capital and assemble a portfolio of aircraft, then later evaluates whether securitization is the right way to refinance or recycle that capital.

As Seen on Airline Economics
The structures used in this early stage set expectations for leverage, return, governance and reporting that carry through to any future ABS.
Aviation ABS is one possible chapter in a longer capital story. The formation stage is where that story’s constraints are written: who really drives decisions, how transparent the underlying data will be and how easily the portfolio can meet the disclosure and surveillance demands of institutional investors.
Four common entry paths
Several familiar vehicles are used to build aviation portfolios that may later move into ABS. Each combines a structure, a dominant capital source and a strategic intent. They often lead to similar outcomes, but they do not start from the same place.
- Lessor originated portfolio: An established lessor uses its own balance sheet and relationships to acquire aircraft, manage leases and grow a fleet with securitisation as one of several potential sale or refinancing options.
- Dedicated aviation fund: Institutional investors commit capital to an asset manager (usually a lessor) who builds a portfolio with a defined exit horizon, often with an ABS take out in mind from the start.
- Joint venture: A lessor and a financial sponsor. Here the lessor contributes sourcing and operating capability, while the sponsor contributes capital and return targets.
- Warehouse facility: Funded by banks, this is a more explicitly transitional path that allows a sponsor or lessor to aggregate aircraft over a two or three year period before refinancing via ABS.
What each path implies
These vehicles do not simply differ in legal form. They imply different decision makers, incentives and tolerances for complexity. In a lessor-originated model, fleet strategy and customer relationships may dominate, with securitization used to support a broader corporate plan. In a fund, the manager is accountable to investors for a defined return profile, with leverage and exit timing central from day one.
Joint ventures must balance the objectives of two sets of principals: the lessor and the capital provider. Warehouses sit somewhere else again. Banks focus on collateral and covenants over a short horizon, while sponsors focus on building a pool they can later present to rating agencies and capital markets.
These differences matter because they shape the asset mix, the lease profile and the way risks are managed long before any ABS term sheet is drafted. They also shape how clean the eventual story will look to external parties.
Operational foundations laid at formation
Across all paths, the formation stage is when the operational foundations of a future ABS are either put in place or deferred. Entity structures are set up in multiple jurisdictions. Governance frameworks are defined. Accounting policies and reporting conventions are chosen. Data models for aircraft, leases, counterparties and cash flows begin to take shape.
If these foundations are treated as temporary or bespoke, the eventual transition to ABS can be fragile. Inconsistent documentation, non-standard lease terms and ad hoc data fields are difficult to reconcile under the scrutiny of rating agencies and investors. By contrast, when sponsors insist on consistent onboarding, clear documentation standards and disciplined record keeping from the first aircraft, they are effectively pre-underwriting the ABS they may later seek to issue.
The same is true for controls and oversight. Board composition, delegated authorities and approval processes designed at this stage determine how quickly and reliably decisions can be made when the structure is later examined for securitisation.
Building portfolios with securitisation in mind
Forming an aviation portfolio does not require a commitment to securitise. However, sponsors who want to preserve the option treat three areas as non-negotiable.
First, they build portfolios around lessee credits that would be acceptable in an ABS context and maintain a spread of concentration across airlines, aircraft type and jurisdictions to limit exposure. Asset data is kept consistent across acquisitions: technical information, lease terms, counterparties and performance histories are captured in a way that can be aggregated without rework.
Second, they maintain transparency around capital structure and cash movements. That means clear bank account architecture, reconciled flows and auditable links between contractual terms and actual payments.
Third, they design reporting that can be extended, not replaced, when external stakeholders such as trustees or investors later require more detail.
These disciplines do not change the economics of the early vehicles, but they do influence how easily the portfolio can cross into the disclosure rich environment of securitization. They also simplify life for internal finance and risk teams, who otherwise bear the burden of rebuilding information under tight timelines.
Formation as the first test of durability
For ABS issuers, the practical question is not which vehicle is “best.” It is whether the chosen path to aviation ABS creates or reduces friction later in the lifecycle. A lessor-led portfolio with disciplined onboarding and governance can be a stronger ABS candidate than a fund with looser data practices, even if the latter was notionally designed for securitization from the start.
Treating formation as the first phase of the ABS lifecycle changes the evaluation lens. Instead of asking only about target spreads or leverage, boards can ask how well the structure will stand up to years of operational reality and external scrutiny. That perspective recognises that the durability of an aviation ABS is shaped as much by early operational choices as by the eventual transaction itself.

